PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND THE
"INTERNAL AFFAIRS" RULE
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson,1 the minority shareholders of a family corporation that was doing business in Louisiana
but had been incorporated in Delaware, sued the corporation in a Louisiana federal district court to rescind a sale of stock they had made to the
corporation. The plaintiffs alleged that the officers, who were also the
majority shareholders, had conspired to purchase the outstanding minority shares at a low price and then liquidate the corporate assets for a
large profit.' The district court found for the plaintiffs, apparently
applying Louisiana law as a matter of course. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. On petition for rehearing, the defendants
argued the widely accepted rule that, when the issue involves the "internal affairs" of a foreign corporation, the law of the state of incorporation should be applied.' If the court had applied Delaware law, the
plaintiffs probably would have been denied relief, because, as the court
indicated, Delaware law does not impose a fiduciary duty upon the officers of a corporation when they are purchasing stock from minority
shareholders for the corporation. 4 Faced with this choice-of-law question, the court rejected the rule that the law of the state of incorporation
IN

'268 E.zd 317 ( 5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 36. U.S. 885 (1959). The instant case
denied a re-hearing of the prior determination on the merits. 263 F.2d 748 (sth Cir.
1959).

'Plaintiffs claimed at least $3,300,000 damages. Brief for Appellee, p. 5, Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 242 F.zd 45 (sth Cir. 1957).
'See Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 3z6 U.S.'549 (x946), where the Supreme
Court reversed the holding of a district court that had refused jurisdiction of "internal
affairs," and at the same time called for the application of the law of the state of
incorporation. See also, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS § 197 (1934)j Latty, Pseudoforeign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 138-43 (.955).
'"Apparently, Delaware imposes no fiduciary duty on the part of the officers or
directors or majority stockholders in buying stock from the minority or individual
stockholders."
z68 F.zd at 320, citing Cahall v. Loffland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 1x4 Ad.
224 (Ch. gz1).
But see, Guth v. Loft, Inc., z3 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.zd 503 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (officers and directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the stockholders).
In

Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 16z F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cii. 1947), the court stated: "The
majority has a right to control, but when it does so it occupies a fiduciary relation.
toward the minority . . . . " See also, Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., Iz5 F.zd 369 ( 7 th
Cir. 194.), and cases cited therein. Under these cases, it is arguable that application

of Delaware law would have produced the same result.
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governs the internal affairs of a foreign corporation and upheld the
district court's application of Louisiana law.
The Mamsfield case thus raises the recurring problem whether the
law of the forum or that of the state of incorporation is applicable to a
pseudo-foreign corporation. Early decisions took the position that local
courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes which concerned the
"internal affairs" of a foreign corporation. 5 This approach has been
side-stepped by one technique or another, so that this rule presently
amounts to little more than one of forum-non-conveniens. This is
particularly true where the corporation is predominantly local. Although courts now take jurisdiction of cases involving "internal affairs"
of foreign corporations, the choice-of-law rule requires that the law of
the state of incorporation be applied. 7 Evolution comparable to that
in the jurisdictional problem can be expected in the choice-of-law issue.
Apparently, this evolution has begun, although courts which have chosen
to apply local law to pseudo-foreign corporations still pay lip service to
the general rule while circumventing it by concluding that the particular
issue does not involve an "internal affair." s
In the Mansfield case, however, the court's decision to apply the law
of Louisiana was not reached by a manipulation of the "internal affairs"
label. Referring to cases holding that the law of the state of incorporation is applicable to "internal affairs," the court said: 9
5See 17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8425 (perm. ed. 1933); 20 CJ.S.
Corporations § 1879 (1940).
See Note, The "Internal Affairs" Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 666

('949).
N.C.

GEN.

STAT. § 55-133(a) (Supp.

1959)

provides: "No action in the courts of

this State shall be dismissed solely on the ground that it involves the internal affairs of
a foreign corporation but the court may in its discretion dismiss such an action if it
appears that more adequate relief can be granted or that the convenience of the parties
would be better served by an action brought in the jurisdiction of its incorporation or
in the jurisdiction where the corporation has its executive or managerial headquarters
or, because of the circumstances in some other jurisdiction."
'See note 3 supra.
'See Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. z8, 97 A.zd 18o (Ch. 1953) (suit by
stockholder for an injunction preventing the remaining stockholders from conducting a
directors' meeting was held to involve the individual stockholders, not the "internal
affairs" of the corporation) ; Loan Soe'y of Philadelphia v. Eavenson, 241 Pa. 65, 88
Adt. 295 (1913) (suit by a corporation against former officers and directors to recover
losses sustained due to their negligence did not involve "internal affairs"). But see,
Rosenfield v. Roebling Coal Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 348, 5 A.zd 695 (Ch. 1939) (stock-

holders' suit against a corporation based on alleged misappropriation and waste of funds
by officers and directors did involve "internal affairs"). See also, Annot., 155 A.L.R.
(1945) 5 Note, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 413 (1946).
9268 F.2d at 321.
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Those decisions are, however, in our opinion, either inapplicable or unsound where the only contact point with the incorporating state is the naked
fact of incorporation and where all other contact points, such as residence of
parties and actors, situs of property, lex loci delecti or contractus, place where
corporation is conducting its only or principal place of business, et cetera, are
found in another jurisdiction. Certainly, in such a situation the charter of the
corporation and even nonrepugnant statutory laws of the state of incorporation limiting corporate powers should govern the internal affairs of the corporation. When, however, the situation is such as here, where neither the charter
nor the statutory laws of the incorporation state are applicable, and all contact
points are in the forum, we believe that the laws of the forum should govern.
According to this approach, even an extremely "local" foreign corporation should, in some matters, be governed by the law of the state
of incorporation. The court in Mansfield noted this when it observed
that the charter and nonrepugnant regulatory statutes of the incorporating state should govern in certain matters. A court should, for example,
apply the incorporating state's law to such questions as whether the
corporation has the requisite number of incorporators,"0 whether all the
corporate powers must be explicitly stated in the charter," and whether
stockholders pre-emptive rights must be expressly provided for in the
charter.' 2
Where, however, the corporation's only contact with the incorporating state is the fact of incorporation, and where all other contact points,
such as residence of parties and place of business, are within the forum,
local law should supplant foreign law. The court declared that those
decisions which applied the law of the state of incorporation when the
question involved "internal affairs," were unsound or inapplicable.
Perhaps such a dear-cut case will arise only rarely because the activities
of few pseudo-foreign corporations occur solely within the forum. Moreover, this was not the situation in the Mansfield case. Besides its activities in Louisiana, the corporation owned a small railroad and substantial
timber in Arkansas, 3 as well as a retail system in Arkansas and Texas.' 4
10IOWA

CODE ANN.

§491.2

(1949),

permits incorporation by a single person.

The usual statute requires three -incorporators. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § TO' (1953).
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121 (1953), allows the corporation to exercise only
those few powers enumerated in the statute, plus the powers expressly given in its charter,
while NEv.REv. STAT. § 78.035 (1957), provides that the corporation may have any
lawful power unless expressly limited by the certificate of incorporation.
' CAL. CORu'. CODE § i io6, requires that pre-emptive rights be expressly provided,
while Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 1701.40 (Page 1954), provides for pre-emptive rights
unless expressly excluded in the articles of incorporation.
" Brief for Appellee, p. 9.

"' Ibid.
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Furthermore some of the plaintiff-stockholders were citizens of Arkansas.: 5 It is dear from these facts that the "all contacts" requirement
was not met in this case. It must be noted, however, that many activities
of the corporation were carried on in Louisiana, and several of the
parties to the action were Louisiana residents. Thus, the court probably
had in mind a test based only upon dominant contacts with the forum
state.
In any event, the court overlooked the fact that the corporation
conducted activities outside the forum, applied its "all contacts" test,
and held that Louisiana law was applicable. By apparently grounding
its decision to apply local law on an erroneous assumption of fact, the
court found it unnecessary to express the underlying policy reasons
governing its choice of applicable law. 6
The policy considerations which justify such a result have, however,
been articulated in several comparable cases. An Oklahoma court, after
describing a Delaware corporation as "tramp" or "migratory," held that
a local statute giving stockholders the right to inspect corporate books
was applicable to that corporation. 17 The court rationalized that the
corporation was not, strictly speaking, "a foreign corporation with
respect to the examination and inspection of its books and records by
stockholders."' This language dearly reflects the court's prior conclusion that local law should have been applied to that controversy. The
reason for a similar prior conclusion was spelled out by the Supreme
Court of Iowa as a "consideration of public policy, convenience, expedience and justice." 9 Only rarely do courts allude to these factors.
Usually, the underlying reasons for applying local law are obscured by
manipulation of the "internal affairs" label. Nevertheless, the policy
factors which have led to such manipulation have remained constant. 2
5 Id. at
1"

5.

Cases applying local law have been categorized as: cases turning on situs of shares

of stock sought to be garnisheed for debt, Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Dev.
Co., 157 Cal. 16, io6 Pac. 98 (i909), and cases finding the law of the incorporating
state contrary to local policy, Hill v. Beach, x7 N.J. Eq. 31 (Ch. 1858); Empire
Mills v. Allston Grocery Co., 15 S.W. 2oo (Tex. Ct. App. x891). See Latty, supra
note 3, at i5o-55.
"Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 127, 141 P.2d 571, 573 (1943).
'8 Ibid.
"OState ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 8x8, 2 N.W.2d 372,
395 (1942)- Although these words were said with reference to accepting jurisdiction,

the court implied that the same considerations would be applicable to choice of law. Id.
at 8og, 2 N.W.2d at 386.
20 See Latty, supra note 3.
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Perhaps the Mansfield decision supports Professor Currie's suggested
approach to the entire conflict-of-laws problem. He proposes that:2
i. Normally, even in cases involving foreign factors, a court should, as a
matter of course, look to the law of the forum as the source of the rule of
decision.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state, rather than the law
of the forum should furnish the rule of decision, the court should first of all
determine the governmental policy-perhaps it is helpful to say the social,
economic or administrative policy-which is expressed by the law of the
forum. The court should then inquire whether the relationship of the forum
state to the case at bar-that is, to the parties, to the transaction, to the subject matter, to the litigation-is such as to bring the case within the scope of
the state's governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for the
assertion that the state has an interest in the application of its policy in this
instance.
Under this proposal, the applicability of local law would be determined
by the importance of the local policy embodied in the rule and on the
extent of local contact with the controversy. 2
In the Mansfield case, the Louisiana rule that the officer-shareholders
act in a fiduciary capacity when purchasing stock from minority shareholders 23 rests on compelling policy considerations: Officers and majority
2 Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governnntal Interests and the

Judicial Function, z6 U. Cai. L. REv. 9-io (1958). See also, Kramer, Interests and
Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 523 (1959), for an excellent
discussion of Professor Currie's theory.
"The application of this test does not appear to raise any constitutional problems.
The Supreme Court, in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (194.3), upheld
the New York requirement of a standard insurance contract to be used within that state
despite an objection that this requirement violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court reasoned that: "To insure the protection of state interests
it is now recognized that a state may not be required to enforce in its own courts the
terms of an insurance policy normally subject to the law of another state where such
enforcement will conflict with the public policy of the state of the forum." Id. at 31617. Similarly, the Court has applied the "interest" test in upholding a Louisiana statute
allowing direct action against insurance companies that issue policies contracting to
pay liabilities imposed upon their insured.
In answering the contention that such a statute violated the full faith and credit
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court weighed the interests of the
states involved and concluded that Louisiana?s interest was the greater. "Since this is
true, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel Louisiana to subordinate its
direct action provisions to Massachusetts contract rules?' Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). See Currie, supra note 2i Latty, supra note 3,
at x6z-66.
22 "Louisiana
has long recognized the fiduciary relationship in situations like the
present case . . . .
268 F.2d at 319.
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shareholders should not be permitted to utilize their positions to enrich
themselves at the expense of the minority shareholders; minority shareholders must be able to invest in corporate securities in order to receive
a fair return on their capital 24 an expanding economy requires the capital and hence the confidence of minority shareholders.2 The Louisiana
rule evidences a conviction that the minority shareholder must be adequately protected, and that the fiduciary concept helps provide this
protection.
Keeping these policy considerations in mind, it is necessary to determine whether the corporation's contacts with Louisiana were sufficient
to establish that state's interest in applying its own law. Mansfield's
contacts with Louisiana were well-established. Its principal office was
26
located in the state, and it owned two lumber mills there.

Most of

the negotiation leading to the sale of the plaintiffs' stock also occurred
within the state. 7 Moreover, several Louisiana citizens were almost
wholly dependent on income from the minority shares of the corporation.2 s Thus, it seems obvious that the corporation had sufficient contacts with the forum to justify application of local law.
Weighing Delaware's interest in having its law applied to the case,
it is apparent that Mansfield was the typical Delaware corporation, incorporated there to do virtually all its business elsewhere. Thus, Mansfield's contacts with Delaware were negligible. The argument that uniformity of decision can be achieved only if Delaware law is applied is
not convincing, since there is little likelihood of inconsistency of decision
here. While it can be argued that, by holding Mansfield stock, the
shareholders agreed to be bound by Delaware law, the validity of such
an assertion is, at best, questionable.2 9
Thus, Louisiana's interest in applying its law to the controversy
dearly predominates over considerations that might warrant application
" Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and Intra-CorporateConflict, 17 IowA

L. REV.

33, 315 (1932).

"CLattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majorty
Stockholders, 30 MicH. L. REV. 645, 66o (93z)•
"0Brief for Appellee, p. 9.

27Id. at 17.

1d. at 15-16.
29This is particularly true in this case because the corporation had originally been

incorporated in Arkansas, but had moved to Delaware in 1940. Id. 5-6. Because the
minority stockholders were in no position to prevent this move, it cannot be argued that
they "agreed" to be bound by Delaware law, especially since such a forced "agreement?'
would work such a hardship.
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of Delaware law. While the Mansfield decision does not discuss these
policy factors, it is believed that similar considerations contributed to
the outcome. The Mansfield approach, abandoning as it does the traditional "internal affairs" concept, should contribute to a more sensible
solution of the problem of which law is applicable to a pseudo-foreign
corporation.

